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As research on metacognition has progressed a significant array of definitions,
methodologies and therapeutic applications have emerged. Some of this work has
primarily framed metacognition as an activity carried out by one person in order to
know, monitor, and adjust their beliefs, memories, and behaviors. Accordingly, problems
with metacognition have often been characterized as issues related to cognition. This,
however, risks neglecting how metacognition is also a fundamentally intersubjective act,
one in which human beings know and reflect upon themselves and others primarily
with and through connections with other people. In this paper, we review research
on metacognition in schizophrenia using the integrative model of metacognition and
a research paradigm in which metacognition is assessed within personal narratives.
Stimulated by this work, we discuss how disturbances in intersubjective experience and
metacognitive capacity mutually influence one another, with disruptions in metacognition
perhaps more deeply understood as disruptions in relatedness with others. We then
discuss how metacognition and intersubjectivity each affect mental health. We finally
focus on the implications of this for treatments that target metacognition as well as
future directions for research.
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INTRODUCTION
The term metacognition can be traced back to its introduction in a paper by Flavell
(1979) on developments in education (Moritz and Lysaker, 2018). In this initial piece,
Flavell integrated ideas from developmental and educational psychology (e.g., Vygotsky, 1997),
and emphasized the value of thinking about thinking as people progress developmentally
and acquire new skills and information. In this first paper, Flavell (1979) emphasized how
metacognition involves the conscious awareness of cognitive performance and listed four
components: metacognitive knowledge—stored beliefs about self and others; metacognitive
experiences—reflection about cognitive processes; metacognitive goals; and metacognitive tasks.
This broad definition has served as the groundwork for recent literature highlighting how a
person’s appraisal of their own mental activities can deeply influence how effectively persons
are able to respond to challenges to their health and wellness (Lysaker and Klion, 2017).
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Metacognition, as foreshadowed by Flavell, has come to be
regarded as a complex group of activities. These commonly
include processes related to recognizing individual thoughts,
emotions, and bodily states and reflecting on their relationship
to events within the flow of daily life. Metacognition can involve
recursive processes in which individuals’ specific experiences are
interpreted on the basis of an awareness of the larger context
in which those specific experiences occur. For example, failure
at a task may be understood and attributed to one or more
factors in the context of other failures and successes. Broader
ideas about the patterns and qualities of individuals’ lives are
then understood as evolving as these specific experiences are
incorporated to related other experiences. For example, an
appraisal of one’s competence may be naturally affected by how
a series of specific successes or failures are understood (Moritz
and Lysaker, 2018). Of note, to a large extent many contemporary
approaches to metacognition, including Flavell’s relatively later
work (Flavell et al., 2002), emphasize the practical purposes
of metacognitive knowledge and the self-regulatory aspects of
metacognition. These components are evident in Moritz and
Lysaker (2018) theoretical discussion of metacognition and the
Lysaker et al. (2018) review of different metacognitive approaches
to the treatment of psychosis which treat metacognitive processes
as having a regulatory function that allows person to doubt
and subsequently decide upon different courses of action. One
aspect of metacognition, however, that is often overlooked, is
that metacognition is entwined with intersubjective experience.
Instead of a cognitive activity concretely located in an isolated
mind, metacognition involves phenomena which occur between
persons. Appraisals of experiences, including one’s own thoughts,
wishes, and feelings as well as the outcome of behavior, are
necessarily shaped by the relative meanings assigned to different
aspects of that experience. Those meanings that are assigned
to an aspect of experience are naturally influenced and molded
by how others do or might perceive and think about either
those experiences or to how one is interpreting those experiences
(Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2017). For example, thoughts about
the effectiveness of a behavior are not able to be judged
solely by the person emitting the behavior. Such judgments are
the result of intersubjective processes which have shaped the
meanings we attribute to behaviors. In this sense, meanings
do not emerge de novo, they are jointly constructed. Thus, the
attachment of meaning to experiences, via reflection, always
requires a sense of that experience being potentially or actually,
shared or experienced, by another (Stern, 2004). In this sense,
metacognition can be seen as occurring not just in the mind of
one person but intersubjectively. The ideas we form and reflect
upon about ourselves and others require the real or imagined
presence of other people who are thinking and relating or could
think about and relate to the idea that we are forming of ourselves
and others (Cortina and Liotti, 2010). Examples of real persons
who might in the present think about an individual’s thoughts
and experiences could include a partner, friend, competitor, or
family member. Examples of persons who might be imagined
to think about an individual’s thoughts and experiences could
be a deceased parent, a child or grandchild not yet born, or a
significant other who is not present at the moment, but who
could be present in the future. Consistent with identity and social
identity theories that stress that self-relating is, by definition,
embedded in a social and interpersonal context (Stets and Burke,
2000) the present or imagined other can be thought of as someone
to whom our ideas of ourselves and others are addressed (Hasson-
Ohayon et al., 2017; Lysaker and Klion, 2017). From a slightly
different angle, developmentally there are no isolated human
thinkers in any ordinary sense. Thinking always emerged from
inherited meanings, and meaning is inherited intersubjectively.
To that degree, intersubjectivity is also a condition for the
possibility of metacognition.
One potential reason why research has paid limited attention
to the role of intersubjectivity in metacognition is that
metacognition is often assessed in laboratory or analog settings
where the meaning of the task is nominal or assumed not to
vary significantly in terms of the meanings assigned to it. Many
laboratory tasks are unlikely to be personally meaningful to
the participant. For example, solving an abstract sorting task
may have little personal relevance and so the role of meaning
and influence of intersubjective experience may be negligible or
virtually undetectable. Reflections about behavior in laboratory
tasks are further constrained a highly circumscribed manner as
either correct or incorrect. Hence, the meanings different persons
might generate about the task would not be presumed to vary.
For example, in these kinds of tasks, most people would agree on
whether they made a correct response.
While the neglect of the relationship of intersubjectivity and
metacognition is understandable given measurement approaches,
a failure to consider the role of intersubjectivity limits a
full understanding of the links between metacognition with
functioning as well as approaches to addressing metacognitive
deficits. In response to these limitations, in part, recent research
on metacognition has taken a new direction which may allow the
role of intersubjectivity to come into sharper focus. This work,
which specifically focuses on disturbances in metacognition in
schizophrenia, uses experimental tasks which ask individuals to
recall and describe their experiences and response to psychosocial
challenges. Concretely, the tasks in this emerging experimental
paradigm require participants to provide a narrative, in which
they form ideas about emotionally salient real-life experiences,
to which meanings may be explicitly or implicitly assigned
and then researchers can explore the extent to which complex
metacognitive activities were evidenced (Lysaker et al., 2005).
To date, the majority of work using this method has had the
aim of understanding co-occurring alterations in self-experience
and the associated interpersonal challenges to relate to others
in schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2019). In this work, conjoint
disturbances in the ability to form a sense of how others perceive
or value experience and an inability to see relationships of
fragments of experience with one another, are thought to result
in the loss of capacity for the experience of interiority, historicity,
agency, and intimacy. The impetus for the need to understand
metacognitive processes as they occur during reflections about
challenging aspects of life includes longstanding observations
that persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, and more broadly
psychosis, experience difficulties in binding information into a
larger sense of self and sustain meaningful connections with
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others (Bleuler, 1950; Freud, 1957), often finding intersubjectivity
challenging (Fromm-Reichmann, 1954; Sullivan, 1962). It has
also been inspired by more contemporary work reporting
many persons diagnosed with schizophrenia might experience
difficulties recognizing others’ emotions, motives, and personal
qualities (Pinkham, 2014; Bell et al., 2017; Buck et al., 2018) while
also showing relatively low sense of self-clarity (Hasson-Ohayon
et al., 2014) and low ability to describe their own emotions
(Fogley et al., 2014).
This approach to metacognition may thus offer new
opportunities to reconsider concrete aspects of the relationship
between metacognition and intersubjective processes because
it is explicitly concerned with larger meanings people form
(or do not form) along with the need to address psychological
and social aspects of a person’s life in the world. To that end,
this paper presents an emerging definition of metacognition
as an integrative process and then discusses definitions
of intersubjectivity. We will then discuss research on this
methodology and findings on the relations of metacognitive
deficits and the phenomenology of schizophrenia. With this
foundation, we will explore three issues that this literature
led us to consider: how variation in metacognitive capacity
and intersubjectivity are related, how that relationship
is closely tied to health, and finally how treatments that




Following Flavell (1979) original definition of metacognition as
complex and multifaceted processes, as discussed above, a range
of paradigms for measuring metacognition have been developed
with broad applications to the fields of cognitive, educational,
personality, and clinical psychology. In an effort to piece together
research on metacognition and mental health in particular,
an integrative model of metacognition has been proposed
(Lysaker et al., 2020) which conceptualizes metacognition
as a spectrum of activities which require the recognition
and potential integration of thoughts, feelings and embodied
experience. Regardless of whether recognizing, monitoring one’s
abilities, or altering one’s strategies, this model suggests that
metacognitive activities require the abilities to both notice basic
and distinct emotional, cognitive, and embodied experiences and
to understand the relationships they have to one another. In other
words, metacognition allows for multi-sensory, cognitive, and
behavioral elements to be integrated into a coherent and usable
representation of experience.
For example, while driving, someone might notice that they
are driving unusually quickly, their face is warm, they are
frustrated with other drivers around them, and can think of
nothing satisfying to eat later in the evening. In this situation,
a person might then connect these individual things and
realize he or she is upset. This person might then realize
that being upset is specifically about a conflict with a family
member. This realization can then be a subject for reflection
and that experience of being upset might be connected to other
experiences. Comparing and contrasting it to other times a
person was upset might lead to a realization of a pattern of
relating which can then be used to regulate a current state or
arousal which could again be a subject for reflection and lead to
further metacognitive knowledge.
Metacognition may, therefore, involve activities which vary
in at least two ways. First, metacognitive activities may vary in
terms of their concern with more discrete and limited aspects
of experience which are considered on their own versus broader
phenomena which are comprised of many elements with differing
relationships with one another. Some metacognitive acts may
involve the detection and reflection upon discrete and highly
specific mental experiences (e.g., identifying specific thoughts,
emotions, or wishes) others require the integration or synthesis
of many discrete phenomena into something broader (e.g.,
synthesizing one’s own intentions, thoughts, and feelings into a
sense of oneself as a unique being; Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014;
Lysaker and Hasson-Ohayon, 2014). Metacognition may second
vary according to the subject of reflection. Reflection concerning
oneself, for example, can be distinguished from reflection about
others and the use of that knowledge (Semerari et al., 2003). The
reasoning here is that each calls the assembling of different kinds
of information and their translation into different actions.
While these different aspects of metacognition would be
assumed to deeply influence one another, it is natural that
they could be meaningfully measured using different paradigms.
In the study of psychopathology, these have included, for
example, assessments of the accuracy of particular judgments
about memory and task performance, beliefs about one’s
attitudes, awareness of the limits of one’s own knowledge,
and the degree of integration of senses of self, others, and
one’s place in one’s community (Semerari et al., 2003; Lysaker
et al., 2013). These different aspects of metacognition would
also naturally be multidetermined and supported by a range
of social, psychological, and biological processes. Deficits in
metacognitive capacity in the field of mental health have been
linked, for example, to neurocognitive deficits, interpersonal
trauma, insecurity of attachment, stigma, and social alienation,
any of which could restrict the ability to form and share ideas
about experience (Lysaker and Klion, 2017). A major point that is
raised in this paper is that intersubjectivity is a factor intertwined
with metacognition, suggesting that the sense of self and the
other as subjective human being is essential for the application
of metacognitive acts. This applies for metacognitve acts that are
more discrete, as well as to more synthetic ones. Of note, applying
metacognitive acts that are relatively discrete might require less
engagement in intersubjectivity, although the genesis of meaning,
even with regard to specific discrete event, involves social aspects.
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: DEFINITIONS
Like the construct of metacognition, the construct of
intersubjectivity refers to a continuum of experiences that
occur between people rather than solely in the mind of one
person. In a broader sense, intersubjectivity refers to what
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is occurring between two minds (Beebe et al., 2005). In a
narrower sense, it points to experience of shared states of mind
(Trevarthen, 1998) or a mutual recognition and understanding
of others’ subjective experiences (Benjamin, 1990; Stern, 2000).
Cortina and Liotti (2010) have emphasized that intersubjectivity
is a unique kind of human communication and is a precondition
for human beings to describe experience and ultimately
understand one another. Intersubjectivity is believed to develop
in recognizable stages. For example, Trevarthen (1998) proposes
that intersubjectivity is present in early infancy in a form he terms
“primary intersubjectivity.” In this stage, the infant and caretaker
communicate though the mutual and ongoing regulation of
bodily rhythms and changing levels of affective arousal. Stern
(2000) concretely proposes that a subjective sense of self tends
to emerge from these encounters roughly around the age of
7–9 months and it is during this time that the infant begins to
have a working sense, albeit pre-verbal, of their experiences and
those of the caregiver.
With development, the capacity to symbolize experience is
then proposed to develop next as the infant and caretaker
communicate with each other in more complex ways in what
is termed “secondary” as opposed to “primary intersubjectivity”
(Trevarthen, 1998). This is believed to be facilitated by the
development of the ability to shift attention from a world
consisting of only two persons to one that could be seen by a
third person which then allows for other ways for the infant
and caretaker to understand one another (Tomasello et al.,
2005). This then allows for further translation of experience into
symbols to be shared with others leading to what Stern (2000)
referred to as the verbal self; a self expressed in words and then
later the narrative self, or the self as positioned with narratives or
complex sequences of events.
Fernyhough (2008) thus proposes that these experiences of
intersubjectivity support children to develop both basic and
advanced forms of imagination, narration, and language abilities,
leading to the enhanced motivation to share experience and apply
more sophisticated reasoning regarding mental states of self and
other. Consistent with Piaget (1995) work on the social origin of
mental functions and thinking about continuing development,
he utilizes Vygotsky (1997) conceptualization of the dialogic
nature of the higher mental functions among children and
emphasizes that the origin of reflectiveness is social and that
any “individual” mental functioning is based on processes of
interpersonal internalization (Fernyhough, 2008).
Importantly, as in the case of metacognition, the failure
to develop the capacity for intersubjectivity could result from
multiple sources at different points in time. For example, early
in development this process could be challenged if either the
caretaker or infant has no or limited sense of the others bodily
rhythms or affective states. Gallese (2003) has suggested that
human beings possess discernable and separate neurological
systems which mirror the experience of one another, termed
networks of mirror neurons, and that disturbances in those
processes could disrupt the foundations for relatedness. Others
have suggested that early relational trauma and disturbances
in attachment also disrupt or damage these processes (Gumley
and Liotti, 2019) resulting in a broad range of disturbances in
affect regulation and mentalization (Fonagy, 1991). Social forces
related to inequity and stigma and its internalization have also
been suggested as barriers to having a sense of the legitimacy of
one’s own subjectivity, compromising ultimately the potential for
intersubjectivity (Bassman, 2000; Hasson-Ohayon, 2012).
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ROLE OF
METACOGNITIVE DEFICITS INTO THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Studying both phenomenology and psychosocial function in
schizophrenia, research rooted in the integrated model of
metacognition has explored how well persons can integrate
information within a narrative to form an idea of the self,
others, one’s place in the larger community and use that
knowledge to respond to psychosocial challenges. The research
paradigm begins by soliciting a spontaneous spoken narrative of
the participant’s life and experience of psychosocial challenges.
A rater then using the Metacognition Assessment Scale-
Abbreviated (MAS-A; Lysaker et al., 2005; Lysaker and Klion,
2017) rates metacognition as it organically occurred in the
telling of the narrative to the researcher. The material elicited is
consequently relayed to someone who has explicitly asked about
it, is of significant personal meaning, and is rife with meanings
that are inextricably linked to how others might think about that
material and how others might think about the meanings the
participant assigns as he or she talk about it.
The MAS-A was inspired by an earlier scale, the
Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS; Semerari et al., 2003).
It was developed in 2004 retaining several basic characteristics
of the original MAS (Semerari et al., 2003). Whereas the
MAS was designed to assess the ratio of the number of
opportunities to occurrences for certain metacognitive acts
within a psychotherapy session, the MAS-A instead quantitively
assessed the overall capacity for metacognition. To do this,
the MAS-A departed from the MAS and conceptualized
metacognitive activities as divisible into a series of levels which
range from elemental to more complex activities, with each
gradation reflecting an increase in complexity and each more
complex level requiring satisfactory function at the previous
more elemental level. Concretely then the MAS-A generates a
single score for each dimension (self-reflectivity, awareness of the
other, decentration, and mastery) with higher scores reflecting
metacognitive acts in which more complex integration had
occurred. Thus, accuracy or correctness is not assessed. Scores
instead reflect the degree to which material is integrated when
participants talk about themselves, others, their communities,
and the use of that knowledge to respond to distress.
Research using this paradigm has successfully detected
poorer metacognitive abilities among adults diagnosed with
schizophrenia as opposed to other conditions (e.g., Hasson-
Ohayon et al., 2015) and revealed that having relatively
greater levels of metacognitive deficits was linked to poorer
prospective and future functioning and symptom severity
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(McLeod et al., 2014; Arnon-Ribenfeld et al., 2017; Lysaker et al.,
2020). Most recently and pertinent to the reconsideration of
the relationship of metacognition and intersubjectivity, poorer
metacognition has been uniquely linked to the experience of
impoverished social connections despite having no association
with prosocial behavior (Fisher et al., 2020). It was also linked
to reduction in empathy (Bonfils et al., 2019), psychological
resources needed for social functioning independent of
symptoms (Gagen et al., 2019), and prospective deficits in
expressing emotions to other (Austin et al., 2019). It has
lastly also been found to have a unique link to reduction in
positive forms of self-compassion (Hochheiser et al., 2020).
Of note, metacognitive functioning has also been found
to be responsive to interpersonal interventions including




Initially we suggested that one reason for the relative neglect
of the relationship of metacognition and intersubjectivity was
reliance on experimental paradigms in which the effects of
intersubjectivity were relatively negligible. In response we have
reviewed research which has used an emerging experimental
paradigm require participants to provide a narrative, in which
the thoughts and experiences of other should naturally affect
the meanings participants explicitly or implicitly assign to
experience. Reflecting on this work provides an opportunity to
consider three issues:
1. Variations in metacognitive capacity and intersubjectivity
mutually affect one another.
As illustrated in the clinical research reviewed above,
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia with relatively greater
metacognitive impairments have problems which could be
seen as hallmarks of disturbances in intersubjectivity. They
have fewer intimate relationships, greater difficulties recognizing
the thoughts and feelings of others and greater difficulties
empathizing with others (e.g., Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015).
Considered theoretically, at the simplest level, it is likely that
these co-occurring deficits in metacognition and intersubjectivity
mutually influence one another. For one, with a relatively
fragmented and non-integrated sense of self, it would be more
difficult to understand the experience of others and forge an
empathic connection. As suggested by Dimaggio et al. (2008),
to adequately grasp the experience of other people we have to
be able to form an idea of ourselves experiencing circumstances
similar to theirs, something likely to be impeded by low self-
reflectivity. For example, without the ability to form an integrated
sense of oneself when facing a particular dilemma, it is hard to
imagine that one could jointly share another person’s experience
of that dilemma. This is consistent with hypotheses about
how mirror neurons support social function (Gallese, 2001) as
well as empirical findings in schizophrenia research that better
self-reflectivity predicts emotion recognition independently of
theory of mind abilities (Lysaker et al., 2014). Considered
concretely, losses in metacognitive function may also render
previously coherent sense of social exchange confusing and
senseless, resulting in a loss of agency and sense of who one
is in the larger social world, perhaps similar to the way in
which Kafka’s characters wake up one day and their position
in life no longer make sense (Kafka, 1971). With reduced self-
reflectivity, intersubjective exchanges may then become more
threatening and something to be avoided. Social exchanges may
be overwhelming when another person can form a more coherent
and integrated sense of ourselves than we can, resulting in
the experience that the other person can know us far better
than we know ourselves. With limited metacognitive resources,
social exchanges may stir up aspects of ourselves which are
not integrated and accordingly which can be experienced as
degrading an already limited sense of cohesion, again resulting
in an understandable wish to avoid intersubjective connections
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2010).
From the opposite point of view, substantial alterations in the
capacity of quality of intersubjective experience may also affect
metacognitive function. If the ability to tolerate the presence
of others in intimate ways and think with them, for example,
as secondary to interpersonal trauma, one can readily imagine
that the metacognitive capacities for self-reflectivity, awareness of
others, as well as mastery and decentration might be challenged.
Without people to think with, it seems natural that the sense
persons have of themselves and others will become less complex
and integrated. Without people to share ideas of oneself and
others there would naturally seem to be less to say and then less
to reflect upon. This would be consistent with developmental
models described above (e.g., Stern, 2004), as well as with models
of disturbances in attachment and mentalization models of
borderline personality disorder which link interpersonal trauma
to reductions in the quantity and quality of mentalization (e.g.,
Fonagy, 1991; Gumley and Liotti, 2019). It is also consistent with
finding linking childhood trauma, which is known to affect the
early quality of intersubjectivity, to metacognitive function in
schizophrenia (Aydin et al., 2016) and with observations that
early disturbances in attachment predate the onset of psychosis
(Macbeth and Gumley, 2008).
2. Disturbances in metacognitive capacity and intersubjectivity
have a mutual and synergistic negative impact
on mental health.
A second opportunity that emerges from the studies
reviewed above is the exploration of how substantial decrements
in metacognitive capacity and the quality of intersubjective
experience have a mutual and potentially deeply entangled
influence on mental health. In other words, these two phenomena
not only affect each other but may be deeply involved in
compromises to mental health when they are substantially
disturbed. This possibility may help explain the kinds of profound
disturbance mental illness can have upon the individuals’ life
trajectories and help to see disability as more than a reflection
of symptoms and skills deficits. For example, considering
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psychosocial functioning with deficits in metacognition, the
deeper meaning of persisting when facing a challenge at work or
in a relationship may be less apparent. In parallel, with weaker
intersubjective experience, people may also find themselves as
feeling they can only face a challenge at work or in a relationship
alone. Consequently, the motivation to persist and not withdraw
from work or relationships may be reduced heightened the
possibility of a gradual withdrawal from functioning in the
community. This is consistent with finding suggesting that
a certain level of metacognitive function is needed for the
experience of intrinsic motivation (Luther et al., 2017).
From a different angle, losses in metacognitive capacity and in
healthy intersubjective function might also make it more difficult
for persons to reject stigma and find a way to form a healthier
idea of oneself. For example, it may be difficult to counter stigma
if one’s sense of self is fragmented and a connection to other who
love and hold you in esteem is unavailable. This idea is in line with
findings by Nabors et al. (2014) that better metacognitive capacity
is related to greater ability to reject stigma among persons
with schizophrenia, and with findings by Hasson-Ohayon et al.
(2014) that low sense of self-clarity leaves one vulnerable to the
internalization of stigma without alternative narrative that can
emerge from intersubjective experiences.
Turning to the process of recovery from serious mental illness,
from the view that for many diagnosed with schizophrenia,
disability is intimately related to isolation and a diminished sense
of self, and wellness to a return to a sense of connection to other
and coherent sense of who is in the world (Leonhardt et al., 2017).
Here again joint contribution from metacognitive disturbances
and alterations in the quality of intersubjective experience
seem likely. Both metacognitive capacity and intersubjective
experience seem necessary for a sense of belonging to a larger
group in which its members support and protect one another.
They are also needed for a coherent sense of oneself as knowable
by others and as potential subject of compassion.
Of note, it might be that having either high metacognitive
abilities or high sense of intersubjectivity can serve as protection
from possible negative implications of disturbances in each. For
example, with healthy intersubjective connections, persons might
be able to borrow the capacities of trusted other to help them
form integrated ideas of the self or other. In parallel, with intact
metacognitive capacities, persons might also be able to find
ways to tolerate the distress that comes from the loss of healthy
intersubjective function and find ways to reform connections
with others. This is consistent with findings that having higher
levels of metacognition ability of Mastery, the ability to use
metacognitive knowledge to respond to psychosocial challenges,
may neutralize the effects of poor attachment on symptoms of
borderline personality disorder (Outcalt et al., 2016).
3. Addressing metacognitive disturbances require an
intersubjective approach.
While considering the relationship between metacognition
and intersubjectivity, a final point should be made with regard
to psychosocial treatments that seek to address metacognition
or health, in general and among persons with serious mental
illness. Most directly, one possibility is that psychosocial
treatments are likely to be more effective if and when they
attend to intersubjective experience. If sense making and
the integration of experience occurs largely between persons,
and as metacognition and intersubjectivity are deeply related
phenomena which influence one another and health, then
enhancing intersubjectivity is likely to be a major path toward
enhancing metacognition.
In concrete terms, this suggests that treatments need to
consider people’s intersubjective experience of treatment itself
and not just be conceptualized as a primarily educational
activity. As suggested by the intersubjective metacognitive model
of psychotherapy with psychosis outlined by Hasson-Ohayon
et al. (2017), clients’ and therapists’ characteristics affect the
therapeutic dialog. Accordingly, there is a need to consider
differences in the personal narratives of the client and therapist
with regard to their roles in the mental health system, the role of
the mental health system itself, the meaning of mental health and
lack of it, and the role of the client within psychotherapy.
Most commonly this might be thought of developing a shared
understanding between two people, with both minds having their
own ideas but sharing the experience of encountering each other
(Buck et al., 2015). Such an understanding would be foundational
then for the therapist and client to think about the patient and
jointly begin to try and integrate information in ways that are
meaningful for the patient. A point worth emphasizing is that
the recapturing of metacognitive capacity cannot come from the
clinician. It is not a skill imparted by someone else or a piece
of wisdom or insight delivered from the outside. This idea is
in line with Gerson’s (1996) psychoanalytic observation that the
therapist is engaged in the process of knowing with the client,
and does not decide by him or herself something about the client
that should be provided to him or her. Thus, metacognition
is not something the therapist teaches; rather it is a sense of
the self as existing, as thinking, as interacting, and as evolving
within an interaction.
Evidently, there are emerging treatments which make
this idea explicit including mentalization-based treatment
(Brent and Fonagy, 2014) and metacognitive-based integrative
psychotherapies such as Metacognitive Reflection and Insight
Therapy (MERIT, Lysaker and Klion, 2017). In both, one aim
is to address alterations in the experience of the self and others
via intersubjectivity (Ridenour et al., 2018). In mentalization-
based treatment, persons develop the ability to form more secure
attachments and then become able to develop the kinds of senses
of self and others needed to find their way to a meaningful
life. MERIT by contrast offers a set of eight key elements which
should be enacted in a typical session to enhance metacognition.
These elements are intersubjectively driven and include such
interventions as the therapist sharing with the patients his or her
thoughts or feelings that are relevant to what is taking place in the
intersubjective space (Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2017).
Even if intersubjectivity is not considered explicitly in
treatment, it may still be considered implicitly and understood
as a key therapeutic mechanism. For example, Narrative
Enhancement Cognitive Therapy (NECT, Yanos et al., 2011)
seeks to reduce of self-stigma via the challenges of beliefs
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and the re-creation of self-narrative. By applying narrative
techniques that are related to the capacity for reflection, this
intervention may enhance metacognition. In addition, the effects
of other more focused interventions (e.g., social cognition
and interaction training by Roberts et al., 2015) may also
be enhanced by assimilating an intersubjective metacognitive
framework (Hasson-Ohayon, 2012). Similarly, metacognitive
training exercises may be potentially conceptualized as affected
by the intersubjective experiences this treatment allows leading
to larger metacognitive gains (Moritz et al., 2018). Of note,
as mentioned above, these phenomena may also affect one
another in the opposite direction. For example, the development
of metacognitive capacity may allow for the development
of therapeutic alliance as suggested by Davis et al. (2011)
which may then allow for the development of healthy
intersubjective experience.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
We have suggested that the relationship between metacognition
and intersubjectivity has been neglected, probably in large
part due to paradigms of metacognition that are concerned
with specific tasks which focused on accuracy and biases. To
begin to reconsider the relationship between metacognition and
intersubjectivity, we have turned to advances in conceptualization
and measurement of metacognition specifically in the area of
schizophrenia, a condition in which substantial disturbances in
both phenomena have long been noted. Following this work, we
have proposed at least two keys ways in which metacognition
and intersubjectivity are related: they influence one another, and
are jointly affect health. Concerning psychosocial treatment, we
have suggested that recovery from metacognitive disturbances
is not something that occurs just in the mind of one
person after appropriate training. It is necessarily a matter of
human connection and the establishment of mutual and shared
understanding between persons. Our view is that there are
dangers of disembodied training which on its own may only
reinforce alienation and ultimately be a barrier to the kinds of
complex metacognitive acts which are required for persons to
find a way to manage complex mental health needs and find a
way to a fully satisfying life.
With this message in mind, a few points should be raised
for future work. First, while evidence is accumulating about the
relationship of metacognition and recovery from schizophrenia,
the role of intersubjectivity in the recovery process has been
less studied. While we have explored literature on substantial
alterations in metacognition, it is unclear to what extent
intersubjective experience plays a role in persons who experience
more negligible alterations. In addition, while we have advocated
intersubjective consideration into treatment of persons with
schizophrenia, this is yet to be fully validated empirically.
A recent study showed that the use of an intersubjective
intervention by the therapist, improved outcome for persons
with schizophrenia (Lavi-Rotenberg et al., in press). Notably,
additional studies are needed to support the joint effect of
metacognition and intersubjectivity on health and therapy
outcome. It is also unknown whether other treatments that were
not discussed here and may address more cognitive component
or focus on intersubjectivity solely might be equally or as effective.
Future research is needed which employs a broad range of
experimental paradigms for measuring metacognition and health
among persons with and without disabling mental conditions.
Careful longitudinal designs which take intersubjective
experience into account could allow for the development of
more nuanced accounts of the relationships of different aspects of
metacognition and intersubjectivity with one another and their
linkages with human adaptation.
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